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This paper explores the relationship between factor endowments, technology and industrial structure,
using a panel data-set of Indian industries across states, industries and time. Factor endowments and
technology are found to be significantly related to industry shares, and this is robust to controlling for the
slow adjustment of industrial structure. I also consider the impact of the liberalization of the Indian
economy beginning in 1985 and 1991 on the relationship between these variables. While industrial
structure is always positively related to technological advantage, factor endowments play an increasingly
significant role after liberalization.
INTRODUCTION
The Indian economy has been in transition since the early 1980s. At the start of the 1980s
the economy was largely based on central planning, leaving private enterprise on the
periphery of the economy, governed by a strict set of licensing requirements. This started
to change in the 1980s and 1990s. First Indira Gandhi in 1980 and then Rajiv Gandhi in
1985 began a process of liberalizing the economy. As discussed further in Section I, this
was followed in 1991 by a much larger-scale liberalization, which involved removing
almost all licensing requirements from industry. Kohli (2006a, b) charts the performance
of the economy since liberalization, and discusses the politics behind the policy change.
In this paper I focus on manufacturing industry. The Industrial Policy Resolution of
1956 emphasized the role of heavy industry as the driving force for economic growth.
The resolution also made the state the main player in developing manufacturing
industries. As a result, the liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s had a large impact on
manufacturing. I investigate the relationship between factor endowments, technology
and industrial structure in India, using a panel across industries and states, between 1980
and 1997. This relationship follows directly from the neoclassical model of trade and
production in general equilibrium. However, the neoclassical model assumes a market
economy free from government intervention, which is not the case in India in the time
period under study. Therefore the question I ask is: to what extent does the prediction of
the neoclassical model hold, in an economy that is heavily influenced by government
policy?1
I also extend the basic framework to investigate whether the liberalization of the
Indian economy in 1985 and 1991 has changed the relationship between industrial
structure, factor endowments and technology. This involves testing for the presence of
structural breaks in the econometric specification, and exploring the relationship between
the three variables in each sub-period. By doing so, I can examine whether a centrally
planned economy in the early 1980s related industry share to factor endowments and
technology in the same way as the more market-orientated economy of the 1990s.
My basic approach is that of Harrigan (1997) in his study of the neoclassical model
for a panel of OECD countries. This approach is based on a translog revenue function,
from which is derived the estimated equation that relates industry share to technology,
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factor endowments, and a set of state and time fixed effects. A modification of this
approach which avoids measurement of TFP for the measure of technology, has been
used in Harrigan and Zakrajsek (2000) in a follow-up study on a larger sample of both
OECD and non-OECD countries, and by Redding and Vera-Martin (2006) in their study
of industrial structure in EU regions.
In this paper, I adopt the original approach used by Harrigan (1997), using a new
panel of cross-state industry data on India between 1980 and 1997 to estimate the
relationship between factor endowments, technological differences and industrial
structure. Provided the assumptions of the neoclassical model hold, the relationship
between these three sets of variables should hold both across and within countries.2 The
main innovation with respect to the previous literature is my investigation of the
possibility of structural breaks in the relationship between factor endowments,
technologies and industrial structure as a result of the policy reforms of 1985 and 1991.
The literature on the liberalization of the Indian economy is immense. Recent surveys
of the progress and performance of the liberalization programmes include Srinivasan
(2003) and Panagariya (2004). The general consensus seems to be that, while the reform
process has increased the real growth rate of the Indian economy (from an average of
3.5% between 1950 and 1980, to 5.7% in the 1980s, to an average of 6.2% in the 1990s),
it is still unfinished, and much more needs to be done, especially with regard to some
sectors such as infrastructure, labour laws, health and education, which so far have not
been the main focus of the reforms.3 Section I gives a more detailed description of the
reform process, especially as it relates to industrial activity.
Briefly, my results are as follows. First, my estimate of total factor productivity (TFP)
provides evidence of technological improvement in the sample period. However, this
improvement is not uniform across industries, as some industries showed rapid TFP
growth while others showed no evidence of technological improvement. Second, both
factor endowments and technology are strongly associated with the share of an industry
in the gross domestic product of a state. Factor endowments are much more significantly
related to industry share in heavy industries than in textiles and other light
manufacturing. Third, superior technology in an industry is associated with larger
shares of that industry. Fourth, there is strong evidence that both rounds of liberalization
of the economy, i.e. beginning in 1985 and in 1991, are associated with structural breaks
in the relationship between factor endowments, technology and industrial structure. In
particular, the relationship between factor endowments and industrial structure is
strengthened by the liberalization process. All of these results suggest that the economic
forces underlying the neoclassical model play an important role in determining the
industrial structure of India, and that the shift from a primarily centrally planned
economy to one emphasizing market forces has led to a change in the relationship
between technology, factor endowments and industrial structure.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the empirical
environment, providing a description of the data and the industrial policy of India. This
is followed in Section II by the empirical model used. Section III details the results, and
Section IV concludes.
I. EMPIRICAL ENVIRONMENT
This section first outlines the institutional environment in which the empirical exercise
was carried out, then describes the data used.
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Industrial policy and economic performance in India
The data used for this empirical study spans the period 1980–97, covering both sides of
the economic reform that was begun hesitantly in India in the early 1980s and more
broadly in 1991. Industrial licensing was a central part of industrial policy in India prior
to reform. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951 imposed a licensing
requirement on private industry in almost all industries. A licence was required to set up
a new unit, expand capacity by more than 25%, or manufacture a new product.
Prior to the major reform of 1991, industrial policy was governed by the Industrial
Policy Resolution of 1956. All industries were divided into three categories: those that were
to be the exclusive responsibility of the state, those that were to be progressively state-
owned, and those left to private enterprise. Included in the first two categories was virtually
every heavy industry. The resolution aims to reduce regional disparities in industrial
performance; however, it recognizes that existing concentrations of industrial activity are
often determined by factor endowments and infrastructure. Hence it also seeks to develop
such facilities in underdeveloped regions. All in all, the tone of the 1956 Resolution is one of
state dominance in industry, with the private sector relegated to secondary importance.
In 1985 and 1986, Rajiv Gandhi’s government initiated a set of policies to liberalize
the Indian economy. Industrial licensing was abolished for 25 broad industry groups.
Licensing requirements for capacity expansion and product diversification were relaxed.
Import tariffs were also reduced.
In 1991 India began further liberalization of its economy. This liberalization was
initiated by the incoming government as a result of a balance of payments crisis in 1991,
which in turn was caused by fiscal imbalances throughout the 1980s. Because the reform
was caused by a crisis, initial reforms were focused on macroeconomic stabilization.
Simultaneously, reform was begun in industrial policy, trade and exchange rate policies,
foreign investment policy, taxes, the financial sector and the public sector. These measures
were much more comprehensive than those implemented by Rajiv Gandhi in 1985.
The tone of the Statement of Industrial Policy 1991, coinciding with the reform of the
economy in 1991, is substantially different from that of the 1956 Resolution. It recognizes
that public sector enterprises tend to be inefficient and unproductive, and calls for a
reduction in the number of industries reserved for the public sector to those related to the
military, fuels, mining and railroads, and also for the abolition of industrial licensing for
almost all other industries. The limit on investments in large Indian and foreign companies
was scrapped for many high-priority, advanced technology industries, and access to foreign
technology was made much easier. Overall, it is a statement of industrial liberalization.
The reform from a state-led economic system to a more free-market system has
implications for the empirical strategy to be detailed in Section II. This empirical strategy
assumes free, competitive markets. The question is whether the centrally planned economy
of the early 1980s behaved differently, in terms of the relationship between technology,
factor endowments and industrial structure, from the market-driven economy of the 1990s.
Therefore one of my empirical strategies is to interact post-reform dummies with factor
endowments and technology, to allow me to identify any changes in the relationship
between my variables of interest.
Data
My main data-set comes from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) produced by the
Central Statistical Organization of India. The ASI is a survey of registered
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manufacturing firms, i.e. firms having either 20 or more workers without electrical power,
or 10 or more workers with electrical power.4 This annual publication consists of data at
the 3-digit level by state, which I aggregated up to the 2-digit level, since factor
endowment differences may be more important in determining the mix of broad industry
aggregates. I further combined industries 24 and 25 into a single industry for the
manufacture of all textiles other than cotton; this was because industry 25 (manufacture
of jute and other vegetable textiles) appears in only a few states, so that the few TFP
observations for that industry would prove problematic when running regressions in-
cluding TFP as an independent variable. I therefore had a total of 18 industries. Table 1
shows the National Industrial Classification at the 2-digit level. Notice that we can divide
industries into light industries (industries 20–29) and heavy industries (industries 30–37).
This gives a useful shorthand for summarizing my results.
There was a total of 25 states and 7 union territories in the sample period. The
analysis was performed on the 16 largest states in terms of industrial output because of
data limitations; these states represent over 97% of the total population of India. For
each industry–state pair, data on a wide range of variables are available, from number of
factories to capital employed, workers employed, total inputs and output, value added,
and capital formation. Data are for the period 1980–97, which is an especially interesting
period because of the liberalization of the Indian economy.
Data on endowments come from a variety of sources; the Data Appendix provides
further details on sources and the construction of data. A key source is the data-set
compiled by Ozler et al. (1996), augmented by Besley and Burgess (2000, 2004), which I
further extended using data from the Statistical Abstract of India (various years); see
Besley and Burgess (2000, 2004) for further details on the data.
Factor endowments
Table 2 provides summary statistics of factor endowments. I used three measures of
factor endowments: capital stock, population, and crop area. The capital variable is real
fixed capital. Capital accumulation in India has been extremely rapid over the sample
period, apart from Bihar where the capital–labour ratio actually decreased between 1980
and 1997. On average, each state had almost four times as much real fixed capital per
capita in 1997 as it did in 1980, with Gujarat posting the largest increase of almost seven
times the 1980 real per capita capital stock.
Population and population growth rates also vary significantly across states. The
most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, had close to 156 million people in 1997, while the
smallest states in terms of population were Jammu and Kashmir, and Haryana, with 8.9
million and 18.9 million people, respectively. I have omitted the smallest states and union
territories from the sample. In terms of growth rates, there are states with relatively low
growth rates (Tamil Nadu and Kerala, where the population grew by 23.5% and 25.6%,
respectively, between 1980 and 1997), and states with high growth rates, such as Jammu
and Kashmir and Rajasthan, where the increase in population over the sample period
was 50.2% and 48.9% respectively. With the increasing population and the much slower
increase (and occasional declines) in the area under crops, cropped area per capita is
declining in every state in India.
In our empirical work, we use these factor endowments as exogenous variables that
explain the share of an industry in a state. However, if factors of production are mobile
across locations, it is also possible that these endowments are endogenously determined;
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that is, changes in production structure can lead to changes in factor endowments. This
issue is discussed in the following section.
Share of industries
Table 2 presents data on the share of registered manufacturing in each state in State
Domestic Product (SDP) for 1980, 1991 and 1997, while Figure 1 presents the time series
of this share (each state rescaled to show changes over time more clearly). What is clear
from both table and figure is the difference across states in terms of share of registered
manufacturing in SDP: this ranges from approximately 2% in Jammu and Kashmir to
over 15% in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
There are also changes in this share over time. Despite the rapid growth of the Indian
economy over the sample period, the share of registered manufacturing has not increased
very much. Only four states posted large increases in the registered manufacturing share
of SDP: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Punjab. West Bengal exhibited a falling
share of SDP for registered manufacturing. In general, state industry share tends to
follow the same trend before and after the reform; notable exceptions are Gujarat and
Haryana, where industry share increased dramatically post-reform, and Karnataka,
where industry had been increasing as a share of SDP before reform, but decreased
afterwards.
Turning to industry-level data for registered manufacturing, the share of 2-digit
industries in total registered manufacturing also varies considerably across states and
over time. Consider, for example, industry 20 (food products). In 1980 the share of this
industry in total industrial value added varied across states from less than 2% in Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and West Bengal to over 10% in Andhra Pradesh,
Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. Similar patterns can be found in
TABLE 1
India National Industrial Classification (2-DIGIT LEVEL)
20 Food products
21 Food products
22 Beverages, tobacco and related products
23 Cotton textiles
24 Wool, silk and man-made fibre textiles
25 Jute and other vegetable fibre textiles (except cotton and coir)
26 Textile products (including wearing apparel)
27 Wood and wood products; furniture and fixtures
28 Paper and paper products and printing, publishing and allied industries
29 Leather and products of leather, fur and substitutes of leather
30 Basic chemicals and chemical products
31 Rubber, plastic, petroleum and coal products; processing of nuclear fuels
32 Non-metallic mineral products
33 Basic metal and alloys industries
34 Metal products and parts, except machinery and equipment
35 Machinery and equipment other than transport equipment
36 Machinery and equipment other than transport equipment
37 Transport equipment and parts
38 Other manufacturing industries
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1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997
Andhra Pradesh 8675 60000 163.4 807.1 12281 13777 0.231 0.185
Assam 795 3561 44.4 138.4 3446 3979 0.193 0.155
Bihar 26900 35100 388.7 353.5 11148 10262 0.161 0.103
Gujarat 17000 175000 502.2 3774.6 10695 11064 0.317 0.239
Haryana 4441 25300 347.2 1342.1 5462 6174 0.427 0.327
Jammu & Kashmir 34 110 5.7 12.6 974 1081 0.165 0.121
Karnataka 8781 42800 238.9 863.6 10660 12712 0.290 0.257
Kerala 4330 10600 170.8 331.9 2862 2974 0.113 0.093
Madhya Pradesh 13700 43300 264.7 575.4 21402 25862 0.414 0.344
Maharashtra 27500 183000 441.3 2044.9 20270 22117 0.326 0.247
Orissa 4249 7751 162.1 217.6 8746 6764 0.334 0.190
Punjab 5682 19000 341.5 829.0 6763 7932 0.407 0.345
Rajasthan 4053 33500 120.0 666.4 17350 21714 0.514 0.432
Tamil Nadu 12600 74000 260.9 1243.3 6469 6646 0.134 0.112
Uttar Pradesh 8805 76900 80.3 494.1 24574 26465 0.224 0.170







1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1991 1997
Andhra Pradesh 1474 3446 53077 74324 5.85 9.57 9.49
Assam 1380 2127 17893 25721 4.16 7.44 4.84
Bihar 985 1445 69242 99309 3.45 9.15 7.19
Gujarat 2074 5291 33754 46358 15.11 14.10 26.04
Haryana 2534 5739 12793 18878 10.05 10.53 16.27
Jammu & Kashmir 1928 2465 5910 8907 1.34 1.70 2.70
Karnataka 1624 3805 36750 49560 9.06 10.48 9.43
Kerala 1621 3873 25357 31839 7.59 8.22 7.64
Madhya Pradesh 1463 2514 51655 75200 6.86 6.16 10.64
Maharashtra 2603 5979 62263 89612 19.13 17.73 17.22
Orissa 1420 2085 26210 35619 4.74 7.25 5.34
Punjab 2859 6349 16638 22969 5.91 7.82 8.86
Rajasthan 1313 3036 33771 50293 4.83 6.53 5.23
Tamil Nadu 1601 4229 48184 59513 14.95 16.42 14.56
Uttar Pradesh 1366 2365 109677 155723 4.34 7.87 7.54
West Bengal 1894 3460 54100 75864 12.16 7.10 6.50
nBase year 1981. Figures for capital stock in West Bengal in 1997 are actually for 1996 as data for 1997 are
unavailable.
nnThe value for Jammu and Kashmir for 1997 is the 1996 value.
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different years and in different industries, sometimes to an even greater extent. For
instance, almost 80% of manufacturing value added in Assam can be attributed to
industry 21 (food products), while over 50% of manufacturing value added in Orissa
consists of industry 33 (basic metals and alloys).
At the national level, the performance of individual 2-digit industries is equally
varied. Figure 2 shows the share of each 2-digit industry in total industrial value added.
While most industries seem to have maintained their share of industrial value added,
industries 23 and 27 (cotton textiles, and wood products) show decreasing shares over
time, while industry 26 (textile products) experienced an increasing share over time.
Summary
There is a great variety across states and over time in India in terms of factor
endowments and the performance of industries, both individually and in aggregate. This
leads to the question of whether the variations in factor endowments are related to the
differences in industrial performance.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This section first outlines the theoretical background of the model, then presents the
econometric specification; this is followed by a discussion of the measurement issues
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FIGURE 1. Share of registered manufacturing in state domestic product.
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Factor endowments and technology
The model is derived from neoclassical trade theory. The basic specification makes the
usual assumptions of constant returns to scale, perfect competition and identical
preferences across states. However, I allow for technology differences across states and
industries. States are indexed by zA{1, . . . , Z}, goods by jA{1, . . . , N}, factors of
production by iA{1, . . . , M}, and time by t.
Each state is endowed with an exogenous vector of factors of production, vzt. I
assume Hicks-neutral technology differences such that the production function takes the
form (see Dixit and Norman 1980, p. 138) yzjt ¼ yzjtFj vzjt
 
, where yzjt is the level of
technology in industry j in state z in year t. The Hicks-neutral technology implies that
technological differences affect the productivity of all factors of production in industry j
in state z by the same proportion. The revenue function r(yztpzt, vzt) characterizes general
equilibrium in production, where yzt is an N  N diagonal matrix of the technology
parameters yzjt, and pzt is a vector of final goods prices. As long as the revenue function is
twice continuously differentiable, the vector of net output supplies y(yztpzt, vzt) is given by
the gradient of r(yztpzt, vzt) with respect to pzt.
5
I followed Harrigan (1997) and Redding and Vera-Martin (2006) in assuming a
translog revenue function, which is a flexible functional form that provides an arbitrarily
close local approximation to any true underlying revenue function:
ð1Þ




















































FIGURE 2. Share of industry in country-wide registered manufacturing.
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where j, kA{1, . . . , N} index goods and i, hA{1, . . . ,M} index factors. Symmetry of cross
effects requires that, for all j, k, i and h,
ð2Þ bjk ¼ bkj and dih ¼ dhi:

















Differentiating ln r(yztpzt,vzt) with respect to each ln pj gives the share of good j in
GDP as a function of prices, technology and factor supply:
ð4Þ Szjt ¼ pzjtyzjtðyztpzt; vztÞ










This is a general equilibrium relationship between industry shares and prices,
endowments and technology. Changes in the RHS variables have different effects in
different industries, as captured here by the industry-specific coefficients.
Econometric specification
I first write equation (4) as









gji lnðvzitÞ þ ezjt;
where ezjt is a random error. Equation (5) can be estimated for each industry, pooling
observations across states z and time t. However, one problem with estimating (5) is that
prices of individual industries are not observable across states.
I followed Harrigan (1997) and Redding and Vera-Martin (2006) in treating price as




bjk lnðpzjtÞ ¼ Zzj þ mjt þ uzjt; uzjt  Nð0; s2j Þ;
such that the price of non-traded goods comprises state-industry fixed effects Zzj,
industry-specific time dummies mjt, and a random component uzjt and we get







where ozjt ¼ ezjt þ uzjt, and mjt is the time-specific effect of all goods prices. The state-
industry fixed effect Zzj will also control for unobserved time-invariant differences across
states that are allowed to have heterogeneous effects across industries. Equation (7) is our
first estimated equation. It relates the share of an industry to factor endowments and
technology, and industry–time and industry–state fixed effects.
The neoclassical model assumes free movement of factors among sectors. If
reallocation of factors occurs with a lag in response to changes in technology, prices,
and aggregate factor endowments, equation (7) will hold only after adjustment has taken
place. With slow adjustment to equilibrium, output shares in the short run can be
modelled as a dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable:






gji lnðvzitÞ þ ozjt;
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where lj is the speed of adjustment, and the long run effect of a change in yzjt is given by
bjk/(1 lj). Because symmetry requires bjk ¼ bkj, it also requires lj ¼ lk. Therefore, the
coefficient on the lagged output share will be constrained to be the same for each
equation when (8) is estimated. In short panels the OLS estimator of lj is biased and
inconsistent. Following Anderson and Hsiao (1981), therefore, I took first differences in
(8), yielding






gjiD lnðvzitÞ þ Dozjt:
The first-differenced lagged dependent variable DSzj,t  1 is instrumented with a two-
period lag of the dependent variable, Szj,t  2. As Baltagi (2005) shows, this is a valid
instrument and yields a consistent estimate as long as ozjt are not serially correlated.
Equation (9) is our second estimated equation.
Total factor productivity
In estimating equations (7) and (9), I also needed a measure of yzjt, the Hicks-neutral
technology parameter. I calculated net-value added (NVA)-based total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) indices, using data on NVA, labour input and capital input. All values were
deflated using industry-level price deflators.
Thus, suppose that value added NVA is a function of capital k and labour l.
Suppressing industry and time subscripts for readability, for any given industry–time pair
the index for any two states x and z is












where l and k are geometric averages over all the observations in the sample,
slz ¼ ðslz þ slÞ=2, where slz is labour’s share in output in state z. I calculated TFP relative
to the geometric mean for each industry, so that, for state z, equation (10) simplifies to:








This is the equation that is used to calculate TFP. It is a general superlative index number
measure of TFP, meaning that it is exact for the flexible translog form.6 Since the share of
labour is relatively noisy and sometimes exceeds 1, I followed Harrigan (1997) in using a
smoothing procedure. When the production function is translog and markets clear,
labour’s share in NVA of industry j at time t in state z is





If observed labour shares deviate from this equation by an i.i.d. error term, then the
parameters of this equation can be estimated for each industry by regressing the share of
labour on a set of state fixed effects and the capital–labour ratio. The fitted values from
this equation are then used as the labour cost shares in the TFP equation (11).
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Estimation
Since I was controlling for both time and state fixed effects, identification of the
parameters of interest in (7) and (9) is through within-state time series variation. The
translog revenue function implies the presence of cross-equation restrictions on the
coefficients on TFP (bjk ¼ bkj). These cross-equation restrictions imply that the errors are
correlated across equations. Therefore, the appropriate way to estimate the system of
equations is to use a restricted SURE (seemingly unrelated regressions) estimator. To
take into account potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the errors, I used
an iterated SURE procedure with heteroscedastic-robust standard errors clustered by
state. The resulting estimator is the maximum-likelihood SURE estimator.
In equation (7) I imposed the linear homogeneity assumptions above (equation (3)). I
can therefore test whether or not these conditions hold. In terms of the model, this is a
test of whether the revenue function is homogeneous of degree 1, or equivalently whether
the sum of the factor endowment coefficients is equal to zero (
P
igji ¼ 0) in an
unconstrained version of the model.
I also conducted tests for parameter stability over time, to test for changes in the
impact of endowments and technology on industry shares caused by economic reform in
1985 and 1991. As discussed below, this was done by including a set of interaction terms,
interacting a reform dummy with the RHS variables, and performing a w2-test on the
joint significance of these interaction terms.
Finally, several additional explanatory variables were included in the basic
specification as a robustness check on my results. I added the political history of the
states to control for possible effects of different political parties on industrial structure,
the Besley–Burgess (2004) labour regulation measure to account for pro-capital or pro-
labour biases of state governments, and measures of market access calculated as distance-
weighted state domestic product to account for proximity to markets and sources of
supply. While several of the coefficients on these variables are statistically significant,
they do not substantially change the following basic results on the relationship between
industry shares, factor endowments and technology, and are omitted for brevity.7
There is a potential endogeneity problem in estimating equations (7) and (9) using
state-level data, because of the potential for factor mobility across states. This poses no
difficulty for crop area, which is immobile. It poses little difficulty for population as well,
as labour mobility across states in India is relatively low: in the 1981 census, 95.2% of the
Indian population was born in the state in which they were currently residing. The
equivalent number in 1991 was 95.9%. Compare this with the United States, where in
2000 only 91.3% of the population were living the same state as they did in 1995 (see
Franklin 2003). Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) show that the low geographical mobility
in India may be attributable to sub-caste networks which act as disincentives to
movement.
Capital mobility across states in India is more of an unknown quantity. I
experimented with using an instrumental variables approach to address the possible
endogeneity of capital stock. However the instruments we usedFinstalled electricity
generating capacity and total bank credit in a stateFproved to be not very strong
instruments for the capital stock. To avoid weak instrument problems, I report only
the uninstrumented results in the next section. I was not, therefore, able to
obtain causal relationships between variables in the regression, although (similarly to
Redding and Vera-Martin 2006) I could identify associations between the variables of
interest.
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III. RESULTS
Total factor productivity
The total factor productivity data are summarized in Figures 3 and 4. There is clearly
great heterogeneity in performance across industries and states. From Figure 3 it can be
seen that some industries are experiencing rapid improvements in technology, such as
industries 20 (food products), 30 (basic chemicals), 37 (transport equipment) and 38
(other manufacturing). Many of the other industries do not appear to have experienced
much change in TFP over the sample period; in industry 26 (textile products), TFP has
actually declined in the post-reform period.
If we look at the mean of relative TFP across all industries over time weighted by
industry value added (Figure 4), we find that TFP has been increasing over time, from
1.00 in 1980 to 2.00 in 1997. This corresponds to an average growth rate of almost 4.1%,
which is similar to the recent results on TFP growth in India by Unel (2003), but slightly
higher than that obtained by Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) for the same time period.
There appears to be an increase in the growth rate of TFP over time; simple regression
analysis shows the strongest evidence of a structural break in TFP growth occurring in
the late 1980s.
These findings are consistent with the results of Aghion et al. (2006), who find a small
mean effect of liberalization but substantial heterogeneity across states and industries.
Krishna and Mitra (1998) present evidence that productivity growth increased in several
industries in the post-reform period in India. This is not inconsistent with my own result,
as I did find that some industries were experiencing more rapid TFP growth post-reform,
for example industry 37 (transport equipment). Ahluwalia (1991) finds that TFP growth





















1980 1985 1990 19951980 1985 1990 19951980 1985 1990 1995
20 21 22 23 24
26 27 28 29 30














FIGURE 3. Time series of mean TFP, by industry.
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year between 1959 and 1966, falling at a rate of 0.3% per year between 1967 and 1980
and increasing by 3.4% per year between 1981 and 1986.
One possible concern with my TFP measures is that the price deflators that I used to
obtain real values are of questionable value in an economy where the artificially low price
set by the authorities and the frequent shortage of intermediate inputs led to a flourishing
black market for such inputsFa black market in which, clearly, the prices do not follow
those set by the authorities. Therefore, the use of official prices will overstate real output,
and hence may overstate TFP in the pre-reform period, although this depends on the
wedge between official and true prices of both inputs and outputs. This is probably truer
in the period before reform; but since the reform was a gradual process, some sectors and
prices were probably highly distorted several years after the start of reforms.
Regression results
Table 3 presents the results for equation (7), with linear homogeneity and cross-equation
constraints on the TFP terms. According to the theory, the own-TFP effect should be
non-negative; superior technology in a sector should be positively related to greater share
of that industry in the state. I found this to be true in all industries. This coefficient is
positive and significant at the 10% level in all industries, while in 15 industries it is
significant at the 1% level.8
Cross-industry TFP effects are included in the regression but are not reported in
Table 3 for brevity. For cross-industry TFP effects there is a mix of positive and negative
coefficients, as expected, since the underlying model is a general equilibrium model.
Interpretation of this result is difficult since, with more than two factors and two goods,
the predictions of the general equilibrium model hold only as averages or correlations.
We can test whether the TFP terms are jointly statistically significant. This amounts
to testing the general neoclassical model, outlined above, against the more restrictive
Heckscher–Ohlin model, which assumes identical technologies across all locations for
each industry. If the Heckscher–Ohlin model is correct, the coefficients on TFP should be
jointly statistically insignificant. I therefore performed a w2 test for the joint significance
of all the TFP terms. The results are shown in Table 3. For all industries, the TFP terms
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FIGURE 4. Time series of the mean of TFP.
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differences across industries and locations have a statistically significant relationship with
the share of an industry in a state.9
For factor endowments the results are mixed. The endowment variables are highly
significantly associated with industry share in industries 33 (basic metals) and 37
(transport equipment), and are marginally significant in several other industries. The sign
of the coefficients suggests that industries 30 (chemicals), 31 (rubber and plastic) and 33
(basic metals) are associated positively with capital stock, but negatively with labour.
While we should not draw too strong a conclusion from this result, because the
relationship between factor endowments and industry share hold only as correlations
with more than two goods and two factors, it is at least in accord with our prior that
heavy industries are capital-intensive. If we divide industries into light industries
(industries 20–29) and heavy industries (industries 30–37), we can see that crop area is
more significantly related to light industries than to heavy industries, whereas capital
stock is not significantly related to any light industry but is significantly related to several
heavy industries. Hence there is some indication that capital endowments matter more in
heavy industries, and land matters more in light industries.
Table 3 also reports the test of linear homogeneity of the revenue function. The null
hypothesis of linear homogeneity is rejected at the 5% level for 7 out of 18 industries. In 5
of these industries (21: food products, 26: textiles, 28: paper products, 29: leather
products and 31: rubber and plastic) the sum of endowment coefficients is significantly
less than 0; while in the other two industries (33: basic metals and 36: machinery and
equipment) it is significantly greater than 0.
Table 4 shows the results of including a lagged dependent variable in the regression to
take into account slow adjustment. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is
positive and highly significant, but quite small (0.119). This suggests that adjustment of
industrial output to shocks occurs quite rapidly. Even in the short run, own TFP is highly
significant and positively related to industry share in all industries. The joint effect of the
TFP of all industries together is also highly significant, suggesting that technological
differences across industries and states are significantly related to industry shares.
Turning to factor endowments, it is apparent that in the short run factor endowments
are more strongly related to heavy industries (industries 30–37) than to light industries
(industries 20–29), since among heavy industries there are 8 significant endowment
coefficients as opposed to only 4 among the light industries. Most heavy industries are
positively related to capital stock but negatively related to crop area. This result is again
in accord with our theoretical priors, but it is different from Harrigan (1997), who finds
that factor endowments are not significantly related to industry share in the slow
adjustment model. My significant results on factor endowments, and the small coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable, suggest that industrial output adjusts to shocks quite
rapidly in India.
Table 4 also shows the results of my test for linear homogeneity of the revenue
function. In this dynamic specification, there is only one industry (28: paper products)
where the sum of endowment coefficients is significantly less than 0 at the 5% level. This
result, together with those of the static model, suggests that the dynamic model fits the
linear homogeneity assumption better than the static model does.
Testing for structural breaks
Another specification test that I performed was for structural breaks in the data. There
are two candidates for the time of the structural break: the reform initiated by Rajiv
236 ECONOMICA [MAY


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2008] FROM LICENCE RAJ TO MARKET FORCES 237
r The London School of Economics and Political Science 2007
Gandhi in 1985, and the more general reform begun in 1991. One can think of the period
1985 and before as pre-reform, 1986–1991 as a transitional period and 1992 onwards as
the post-reform period. Consider first the possibility of a structural break in 1985. This
can be tested against the null of no structural breaks by running the following regression:
ð13Þ










jjk R ln yzjt
  þX
i
fji R ln vzitð Þ½  þ ozjt;
where R is an indicator variable taking value 0 if the observation is from before 1986, and
1 if the observation is from after 1985. The coefficients on the interaction terms represent
the change in the impact of that variable after the year in question. A w2-test of the joint
significance of the coefficients fji in equation (13) is a test of whether the relationship
between factor endowments and industry share, differs before and after 1985. Similarly,
the joint significance of the coefficients jjk in equation (13) is a test of whether the
relationship between technology and industry share, differs across these time periods. To
test for the presence of a structural break in 1991, I estimated the same equation,
replacing R with an indicator variable to divide the sample into Before and After 1991.
Since my results for the static and dynamic models are not very different, I restrict my
attention in this subsection to the static model, without the lagged dependent variable.10
Table 5 presents the results of the tests for structural breaks in the relationship
between industry shares, factor endowments and TFP. The table shows an interesting
pattern of results. Looking first at factor endowments, there is evidence of at least one
structural break between the two years considered for all but five industries (20: food
products, 26: textiles, 27: wood products, 30: basic chemicals and 38: other
manufacturing). However, only in the two machinery and equipment industries (35
and 36) is there evidence of structural breaks in both years.
The timing of the break also differs across different types of industry. In what I call
light industries (20–29), there is stronger evidence of structural breaks in 1991 than in
1985, whereas in what I call heavy industries (30–37), there is stronger evidence of
structural breaks in 1985 than in 1991. This suggests that the early reforms of Rajiv
Gandhi had a larger impact on heavy industries than on light industries, for which the
major reform was the 1991 reform. This is consistent with the liberalization of the capital
and intermediate goods sectors but not the consumption goods sectors in the 1980s. Only
in the post-1991 reforms was there de-licensing that affected most of the industries in the
economy.
There are fewer such patterns in the tests for structural breaks in the relationship
between industry share and TFP. In almost every industry there is strong evidence of a
structural break in the relationship between TFP and industry share in both 1985 and
1991. Therefore there is evidence that the relationships found in the previous section are
not stable over time. I followed up the results in Table 5 by running the baseline
estimated equation (7) for each of the three subsamples defined above, to see how the
pattern of coefficient significance varies across the different time periods.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 6. The TFP terms are always
jointly significant in every industry in every subsample; technology is strongly associated
with industry shares, irrespective of whether the economic system is one of state planning
(before 1986), free markets (after 1991) or transition (1986–1991). The only exceptions to
this are industries 27 (wood products), 28 (paper products) and 29 (leather products) in
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the transitional period between 1986 and 1991, where TFP was not or was only
marginally significantly related to industry shares.
Somewhat differently, we see much more heterogeneity in the relationship between
factor endowments and industry share. There is some evidence that factor endowments
have a stronger relationship with industry share post-liberalization: not only are there
more tests that are significant at at least the 10% level (9 in the post-liberalization period
compared with 7 in the transition period and 6 in the pre-liberalization period), but also,
the tests are significant at a much higher confidence levelFat the 1% level 6 industries
had a significant relationship with factor endowments post-liberalization, compared with
just 2 in the transition period and 3 in the pre-liberalization period. The heterogeneity of
results may be evidence of indeterminacy of the production structure when there are
more goods than factors, as it becomes difficult to pin down the relationship between
industries and factors across different time periods.
All in all, the results of Tables 5 and 6 show that the reform of the Indian economy
throughout the period under study had extremely diverse and significant impacts on the
TABLE 5












20 0.22 3.66 145.4n 96.2n
21 6.46nnn 4.42 19.6nn 89.5n
22 2.13 15.98n 18.3nn 29.7n
23 2.18 22.20n 93.4n 13.0
24 6.66nnn 0.28 30.3n 396.7n
26 1.97 4.36 44.7n 82.4n
27 3.56 0.03 22.0n 99.1n
28 3.59 2.43 164.5n 61.4n
29 1.97 37.45n 9.0 28.5n
30 2.41 4.11 154.1n 32.5n
31 5.18 28.07n 27.7n 82.8n
32 0.61 6.89nnn 197.5n 254.9n
33 14.29n 0.64 209.2n 232.4n
34 68.03n 0.51 35.2n 79.4n
35 13.80n 35.82n 25.9n 143.9n
36 12.50n 7.58nnn 133.7n 41.5n
37 19.95n 0.48 40.9n 16.3nn
38 1.37 1.05 83.7n 549.5n
Notes:
nnnSignificant at 10%; nnsignificant at 5%; nsignificant at 1%.
The estimation method is iterated SURE with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered by state. The full
specification, including endowments, TFP, and state and year effects, and a full set of interactions for the
structural break in either 1985 or 1991, is run.
‘Endowments’ is the test of the joint significance of structural breaks in factor endowments.
TFP is the test of the joint significance of structural breaks in TFP. The degrees of freedom differ between the
endowment and TFP tests, so the chi-squared statistics are not strictly comparable between endowments and
TFP.
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different industries in India.11 The reform of the Indian economy has changed the
relationship between factor endowments, technology and industrial structure. This is
consistent with the idea that the relationship between these variables is different in a
centrally planned economy from that in a market-orientated economy.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper has been to explore the relationship between factor
endowments, technology and industrial structure across states in India. To do so, I have
used a neoclassical trade model, which has been used successfully in explaining industrial
structure in more developed countries. This allows us to consider the extent to which
such a neoclassical model can be successfully used for developing countries. My data-set,
which is a panel of 16 states and 18 industries from 1980 to 1997, covers a period of
change in the policy environment towards private economic activity in India. I was
TABLE 6
Estimation Using Subsamples Divided into Before Liberalization, Transition




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1980–85 1986–91 1992–97 1980–85 1986–91 1992–97
20 2.73 0.54 1.18 458.55n 74.15n 45.81n
21 3.3 4.21 16.85n 424.88n 108.43n 16.85nn
22 20.4n 7.95nn 4.59 36.13n 56.68n 128.27n
23 0.99 1.03 4.35 38.81n 55.06n 41.01n
24 0.47 4.04 21.64n 25.65n 38.95n 407.32n
26 1.93 2.71 7.1nn 27.57n 34.91n 43.29n
27 7.8nn 0.65 24.97n 57.91n 15.15nnn 19.41nn
28 3.85 5.51nnn 49.29n 46.95n 13.23 49.17n
29 4.13 1.45 2.03 226.47n 14.85nnn 115.12n
30 1.92 1.99 5.99nnn 641.1n 223.71n 525.91n
31 2.38 4.89nnn 9.04nn 1159.4n 410.53n 346.45n
32 4.65nnn 5.64nnn 0.94 47.55n 819.59n 17.8nn
33 3.96 18.09n 11.35n 399.28n 317.96n 462.16n
34 5.41nnn 4.85nnn 0.98 2296.9n 652.25n 132.02n
35 4.34 2.09 0.07 294.52n 115.26n 164.22n
36 81.87n 1.21 3.13 50.38n 28.81n 95.77n
37 0.09 13.4n 2.75 59.35n 98.33n 42.78n
38 19.98n 1.82 10.18n 84.21n 78.21n 264.69n
Notes:
nnnSignificant at 10%; nnsignificant at 5%; nsignificant at 1%.
The estimation method is iterated SURE with heteroscedastic robust standard errors clustered by state. The full
specification, including endowments, TFP and state and year effects, is run for three subperiods: 1980–85, 1986–
91, and 1992–97. The figures reported are chi-squared values for the test of the joint significance of endowments
and of TFP. The degrees of freedom differ between the endowment and TFP tests, so the chi-squared statistics
are not strictly comparable between endowments and TFP.
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therefore able to consider the impact of these economic reforms on the relationship
between factor endowments, technology and industrial structure.
The main results are as follows. First, I find evidence of improvements in average
TFP over time. However, there is also great heterogeneity in TFP performance across
states and industries, with some industries not exhibiting any growth in TFP. Second,
both factor endowments and technology are strongly related to the location of industries.
There is evidence that land is negatively, and capital stock positively, related to heavy
industry. Higher levels of technology in an industry are associated with a larger share of
that industry in a state.
Third, there is strong evidence of structural breaks in the relationship between
technology, factor endowments and industry share over the period under study. This has
been a period of reform in the Indian economy, with the initial reforms of Indira Gandhi
in 1980 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1985 and the more general liberalization in 1991. These
changes correspond to a shift from a centrally planned economy to a more market-
orientated economy. Factor endowments are more significantly related to industry shares
post-reform.
In conclusion, the neoclassical model, when suitably extended, provides a relatively
successful explanation of the pattern of production across regions within a developing
country such as India. Its application is not therefore limited to the developed world, and
it provides a suitable framework for exploring how market-orientated reforms have
changed the relationship between industrial structure, technology and factor endowments.
DATA APPENDIX
The data come from many sources. My data-set builds on Ozler et al. (1996) and Besley and
Burgess (2004).
State population data used to express magnitudes in per capita terms come from the 1971,
1981, 1991 and 2001 censuses (Census of India, Registrar General, and Census Commissioner,
Government of India) and have been interpolated between census years. State domestic product
comes from Estimates of State Domestic Product published by Department of Statistics, Ministry of
Planning, Government of India.
Industry data are from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), Central Statistical Office,
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India. Data are available at the 3-
digit level, following the National Industrial Classification (NIC). The data in the ASI are for
registered manufacturing, defined as firms with 20 or more workers but no electrical power, or firms
with 10 or more workers and electrical power. There is a change in industrial classification in 1987
and, in order to match the 1970 and 1987 NICs, I aggregated a small number of 3-digit industries. I
excluded miscellaneous manufacturing industries, as these are likely to be heterogeneous across
states. The industries ‘Minting of Currency Coins’ and ‘Processing of Nuclear Fuels’ were also
excluded, as outcomes in these industries are likely to be determined by special considerations. This
left a total of 138 industries, which were then aggregated to the 2-digit level.
The dependent variable in the regressions is the share of industry value added in state domestic
product. Industry value added is calculated as the sum of net value added and depreciation; this is
divided by state domestic product to get the share of an industry. Fixed capital also comes from the
ASI; it represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by the factory on the closing date of
the accounting year.
To calculate total factor productivity using the net value added approach, the following
industry-level variables from the ASI were used:
 Net value added: the increment to the value of goods and services contributed by the factory
 Fixed capital: the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by the factory
 Workers: all persons employed in any kind of work connected to the manufacturing process.
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The industry level share of labour in value added was calculated as the sum of emoluments plus
welfare expenditure, divided by net value-added. Net value added, fixed capital and payments to
labour were deflated by the industry-level price deflator for Machinery and Transport Equipment,
obtained from the Indian Handbook of Industrial Statistics (various issues), 1980–97.
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NOTES
1. This is in line with the injunction in Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) to ‘estimate, don’t test’ economic
models.
2. There are also benefits of using within-country rather than cross-country data, since (i) within-country
data are more likely to be comparable, (ii) any measurement error biases may be expected to work in a
similar direction, and (iii) more generally the assumptions of the basic model are more likely to hold
across states within a country than across different countries. Also, it relates to the original work of
Ohlin, who notes in the preface to The Theory of Trade that: ‘international trade is only a special case of
what could be called interlocal trade, that is, exchange between locations which are characterised by
incomplete mobility of factors and commodities between them’ (Ohlin 1924).
3. There is also controversy regarding the precise timing of the takeoff of the Indian economy in terms of
more rapid economic growth; see e.g. Rodrik and Subramanyam (2004) for a view on the timing of the
takeoff, and Wallack (2003) for an analysis of the timing of structural breaks in the Indian
macroeconomy.
4. Throughout this paper, I use the term ‘manufacturing’ to mean registered manufacturing.
5. A sufficient condition for the revenue function to be twice continuously differentiable and for
production patterns to be determinate is that there are at least as many factors as goods:MXN. If there
are more goods than factors, N4M, production structures may still be determinate if there are
differences in technologies or relative prices across states. If the production structure is indeterminate,
then my estimated equation will perform poorly in explaining industry share across states, in terms of
having statistically insignificant right-hand-side variables.
6. Caves et al. (1982a, b) show how we can obtain the productivity index (10). Griffith et al. (2004) consider
alternative ways of measuring TFP.
7. These additional results are available from the author upon request.
8. There is a potential endogeneity problem with the own-TFP effects, as shocks to own TFP would also
affect the share of an industry in GDP. I regressed equation (7) using IV, instrumenting TFP for each
industry in each state, with the average of TFP in that industry across all other states (following
Harrigan 1997). The instrument has high explanatory power in the first-stage regression, and passes the
Hausman (1978) test of no systematic difference between IV and OLS estimates. This suggests that
biases resulting from endogeneity problems are not severe. Another alternative would be to follow
Nickell et al. (2004) in smoothing TFP using a Hodrick–Prescott filter.
9. This is one advantage of this approach as opposed to that of Harrigan and Zakrajsek (2000) or Redding
and Vera-Martin (2006); the use of separate measures of technology in the regression allows us to
disentangle the effects of technology from other effects that are captured by the state and time fixed
effects.
10. There are several other tests that can be performed using this framework. For instance, one can test
whether or not there are structural breaks in both 1985 and 1991, against various alternative nulls, of no
breaks, or a single break in 1985 or 1991. Finally, one can also test whether all interaction terms,
including the state fixed effects, are jointly significant; this would be equivalent to a Chow (1960) test for
structural breaks.
11. See Aghion et al. (2006) on the uneven impact of liberalization on productivity and output across Indian
industries.
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